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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Petitioner,

Case No. 920803-CA

v.
JASON THOMAS GENOVESI,
Defendant-Appellant.
STATE'S PETITION FOR REHEARING
INTRODUCTION
This petition is filed pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure.

It is filed for one narrow purpose:

clarification of certain language contained in this Court's
opinion, State v. Genovesi, No. 920803-CA, issued February 11,
1994 (copy appended to this petition).

In filing this petition,

the State, as petitioner, reserves its right to raise other
objections to that opinion, should it choose to do so, in a
petition for certiorari review by the Utah Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
AND
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For purposes of this rehearing petition, this Court's
opinion adequately describes this case: Defendant appeals his
conviction for manslaughter, entered following a jury trial. He
argues, in the main, that certain evidence seized from his home,
pursuant to his wife's consent, was improperly admitted at that
trial.

ARGUMENT
THIS COURT'S OPINION SHOULD BE AMENDED, TO
CORRECT LANGUAGE SUGGESTING THAT DEFENDANT'S
CONVICTION HAS BEEN SET ASIDE.
This rehearing petition might be more appropriately
styled as a "Motion for More Definite Statement," cf. Utah R.
Civ. P. 12(e), directed not to defendant, but to this Court. The
language in this Court's opinion on this appeal is susceptible to
ambiguous interpretation, and the State, accordingly, desires
clarification.
The ambiguity arises from the opinion's opening
paragraph, which recites that defendant appeals his manslaughter
conviction.

The Court then states, in the same paragraph, "We

vacate and remand."

Genovesi, No. 920803-CA, slip op. at 1

(emphasis added).
The emphasized term, "vacate," following reference to
defendant's appeal from his conviction, suggests that this Court
has set aside the conviction.

As such, "vacate," in the opening

paragraph, suggests that defendant might be entitled to some form
of release from incarceration (State's records reflect that he is
serving a term at the Utah State Prison)--on bail or otherwise,
pursuant to this Court's opinion.

This suggestion, the State

hopes, is not intended.
The bulk of the opinion contains this Court's
explanation about why the written findings of fact and
conclusions of law, filed by the trial court following
defendant's motion to suppress evidence, are not "sufficiently
2

detailed to allow this court to meaningfully review the trial
court's decision [denying the motion]."

Slip op. at 4.

CONCLUSION paragraph then reiterates that

The

lf

[t]he trial court's

findings of fact and order denying Jason Genovesi's motion to
suppress are insufficient to allow adequate appellate review.
Accordingly, we vacate that ruling and remand this matter to the
trial court . . . "

(emphasis added).

The opinion's conclusion therefore indicates that it is
not defendant's conviction that is vacated; rather, only the
denial of the motion to suppress is vacated, pending entry of new
findings of fact and conclusions of law by the trial court.

If

that is this Court's intention, it should so clarify.
The State sees two ways to achieve such clarification.
First, the Court can modify the use of "vacate" in the opening
paragraph, to clarify that only the pretrial ruling on
defendant's motion to suppress is vacated, while the conviction
remains in force.

Second, the Court could delete the term

"vacate" entirely from the opinion, and state that it is only
remanding this case temporarily for entry of the requested
findings and conclusions, upon which "adequate appellate review"
of the order denying the motion to suppress can then be
undertaken.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's manslaughter conviction, entered upon a
jury verdict, should be presumed valid and fully enforceable,
until and unless defendant, upon "adequate appellate review,"
3

persuades this Court to reverse that conviction.

Rehearing

should be granted, and this Court's February 11, 1994 opinion
amended, to reflect this.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this *S

day of February, 1994

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

J. KEVIN MURPHY
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing State's Petition for Rehearing was mailed, postage
prepaid, to BRADLEY P. RICH, of YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ, attorneys
for defendant-appellant, 175 East 400 South, Suite 400, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111, this

I ^>

day of February, 1994.
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APPENDIX

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
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OPINION
(For Publication)

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case NO. 920803-CA

v.
Jason Thomas Genovesi,

F I L E D
(February 11, 1994)

Defendant and Appellant.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable David S. Young
Attorneys:

Bradley P. Rich, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Jan Graham, David 8. Thompson and J. Kevin Murphy,
Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Russon.1
RUSSON, Associate Presiding Judge:
Jason Thomas Genovesi appeals his conviction of
manslaughter, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-205 (1990). We vacate and remand.
FACTS
On the afternoon of March 20, 1992, paramedics responded to
an emergency "911" call from a residence in Kearns, Utah, where
Jason Genovesi, his wife Lisa, and her two minor children from a
former marriage, Justin and Gavin Adams, lived. Jason Genovesi,
who had been at home taking care of the children while his wife
was at work, had made the call to report an injury to Gavin
Adams, age two. When the paramedics arrived, they found Jason
Genovesi kneeling over Gavin Adams, who appeared to have a broken
neck. Resuscitation efforts were undertaken, but failed, and

1. Judge Russon authored this opinion prior to his appointment
to the Utah Supreme Court.

Gavin Adams was pronounced dead shortly after his arrival at a
nearby hospital.
Soon after the paramedics had left the Genovesi residence to
take the child to the hospital, Deputy Kenneth R. Patrick of the
Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office arrived at the home. Following
a cursory search, Deputy Patrick took some photographs of the
home's interior and asked Jason Genovesi to accompany him to a
local police station for questioning. After interviewing Jason
Genovesi, Deputy Patrick arrested him for child abuse.
The next day, March 21, Deputy Patrick contacted Lisa
Genovesi and requested permission to go into the Genovesi home in
order to "take measurements and search for evidence. •• According
to Deputy Patrick's testimony, he repeated this request three
times, and each time she agreed. During this search, the
officers took additional photographs, particularly of a bunk bed
from which, according to Jason Genovesi, Gavin Adams had fallen,
causing his fatal injuries. Additionally, the officers cut out
and removed a section of a plasterboard wall with a head-shaped
dent in it, a hair that was affixed to the dent in the wall, and
a section of carpet. At no point did the officers procure a
search warrant for the home.
Three days later, Jason Genovesi was charged by information
with manslaughter, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1990). He then filed a motion to suppress
all evidence obtained as a result of the above searches of his
home on the ground that those searches violated his rights under
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
Following a hearing at which Deputy Patrick testified to the
above events, Genovesi/s motion was denied. Genovesi was
subsequently tried by a jury and convicted of manslaughter.
Genovesi appeals, arguing that: (1) the findings of fact
and conclusions of law supporting the trial court's order denying
his motion to suppress are insufficient to permit adequate
appellate review and, therefore, require remand; (2) Lisa
Genovesi's consent to search the home was invalid under the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I,
section 14 of the Utah Constitution; and (3) there were no
exigent circumstances justifying warrantless entry of the
Genovesi home.2 The State responds that: (1) the trial court's
2. Genovesi also argues on appeal that he was denied his right
to a jury representing a fair cross-section of the community
because the trial court accidently eliminated from the venire
(continued...)
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order denying Jason Genovesi's motion to suppress is sufficient
to allow this court to adequately review the trial court's
determination that the evidence in question did not require
suppression; (2) both searches were valid under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I,
section 14 of the Utah Constitution; and (3) even if the trial
court erred in refusing to suppress the evidence obtained in the
searches, such error was harmless.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Jason Genovesi challenges the sufficiency of the findings of
fact and conclusions of law underlying the trial court's order
denying his motion to suppress. M[W]hen assessing a trial
court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we %will not disturb the
factual findings underlying .the ruling unless they are clearly
erroneous.'" State v. James. 858 P.2d 1012, 1015 (Utah App.
1993) (quoting State v. Mincv. 838 P.2d 648, 652 (Utah App.
1992), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992)). "Findings are
clearly erroneous only when they are against the clear weight of
the evidence or when the appellate court is convinced that a
mistake has been made." State v. Lovearen, 798 P.2d 767, 770
(Utah App. 1990).
Although we generally grant substantial deference to the
trial court's findings of fact, we do so only when the findings
11
* disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each
factual issue was reached.'" State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d 880,
882 n.l (Utah App.) (quoting RupK?r v. ppltpn, 598 P.2d 1336,
1338 (Utah 1979)), cert, denied. 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990).
Moreover, Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(c) requires the
trial court to specify its findings on the record when resolution
2. (...continued)
persons with surnames beginning with the letters WAM through lfR."
Specifically, he argues that persons with surnames beginning with
the letters at the end of the alphabet are more likely to suffer
from a condition known as "alphabetic neurosis,11 a term which he
fails to define in his brief. Since this issue is, on its face,
without merit, we do not address it. See State v. Carter. 776
P.2d 886, 888-89 (Utah 1989) (appellate court need not address
every argument, issue or claim raised on appeal); see also state
v. Jones. 783 P.2d 560, 565 (Utah App. 1989) (appellate court
will not engage in "unnecessary verbiage19 to address meritless
arguments), aff'd. 808 P.2d 1056 (Utah 1991); accord State v,
Gray. 851 P.2d 1217, 1228 (Utah App.)# cert, denied. 860 P.2d 943
(Utah 1993).
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of factual issues is necessary to the disposition of a motion.3
James. 858 P.2d at 1014-15; Marshall. 791 P.2d at 882. Since the
issues presented in search and seizure cases are highly fact
sensitive, see, e.g.. Lovearen. 798 P.2d at 770; Marshall, 791
P.2d at 881, the findings of fact must be sufficiently detailed
to allow this court to meaningfully review the trial court's
decision. £affi££# 858 P.2d at 1015; Lovearen. 798 P.2d at 770.
Likewise, the trial court's conclusions of law must also be
sufficient to allow for adequate appellate review. State v.
Pharris. 846 P.2d 454, 465 (Utah App.) (requiring trial courts to
record sufficient conclusions of law on all evidence relevant to
its decision in order to facilitate appellate review), cert.
denied. 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993); see also State v. Arrovo. 796
P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990) (holding that case must be reversed and
remanded when trial court's findings and conclusions are
insufficient to support trial court's findings or court of
appeals's conclusions as to consent); Marshall. 791 P.2d at 88990 (reversing and remanding for a further hearing on the issue of
consent); State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972, 981 (Utah App. 1988)
(reversing and remanding "for the trial court to make sufficient
findings of fact and conclusions on the issue of consent").
Turning to the case at bar, we note that the trial court
made no oral findings of fact, and its written ruling on Jason
Genovesi's motion to suppress consists merely of the following
findings of fact and order:
Defendant's Motion to Suppress evidence
acquired by a search of defendant's residence
came on regularly for hearing the 19th day of
August 1992. The court heard the testimony
of Kenneth Patrick, considered the arguments
of counsel, and finds that:
1. Officer Patrick believed, prior to
beginning the search of defendant's
residence, that he had obtained permission
from defendant's wife to do so.

3. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(c) provides, with our
emphasis: "A motion made before trial shall be determined before
trial unless the court for good cause orders that the ruling be
deferred for later determination. Where factual issues are
involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its
findings on the record."
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2. The lav in Utah allows one spouse to
consent to the search of property owned or
used jointly with the other spouse.
3. Lisa Genovesi, the wife of
defendant, did tell Kenneth Patrick, in a 21
March 1992 telephone conversation, that he
could go to defendant's and her residence to
search for and collect evidence pertinent to
the death of Gavin Adams.
Defendant's Motion to Suppress is
therefore DENIED.
The trial court's findings and order are insufficient in
numerous respects, both with regard to the search that occurred
on March 20, during which photographs were taken, and the March
21 search, during which more photographs were taken and physical
evidence was removed from the Genovesi home.
As to the March 20 search, the trial court's findings of
fact are inadequate inasmuch as the court failed to even address
that search in its ruling, much less make detailed factual
findings concerning the search. The trial court's ruling on
Genovesi's motion to suppress is further deficient as to the
March 20 search because it failed to make any conclusions of law
whatsoever as to whether the warrantless search was justified
because of exigent circumstances or some other exception to the
warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
Accordingly, the trial court's ruling on Genovesi's motion to
suppress requires remand for entry of findings of fact and
conclusions of law as to the March 20 search.
As to the March 21 search, which the court did attempt to
address in its findings and order, the trial court's ruling is
also insufficient. The trial court's first finding, that Deputy
Patrick believed he had permission to search, is irrelevant to
the factual determination that Lisa Genovesi consented to the
March 21 search.4 The trial court's second "finding of fact,"
4. This finding is likely also irrelevant to any conclusion
regarding the voluntariness of Lisa Genovesi's consent. While it
is true that whether consent is voluntary depends on the totality
of the circumstances, including the characteristics of the one
from whom consent is being sought and the details of the police
conduct, Arrovo, 796 P.2d at 689, the State has not cited us to,
and we have been unable to find, any cases holding that the
police officer's mental state is a factor in this analysis.
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that one's spouse may consent to the search of jointly ownec
property, is actually a conclusion of law and does not belc-7 in
the findings. Thus, the only proper finding of fact in the crial
court's ruling is its third finding, which states that Lisa
Genovesi gave Deputy Patrick permission Mto search for and
collect evidence pertinent to the death of Gavin Adams.115
However, even though the trial court properly found that
Lisa Genovesi consented to the March 22 search, it failed to make
any conclusions of law regarding the voluntariness of that
consent. In cases involving the voluntariness of consent, both
the Utah Supreme Court and this court have emphasized the need
for sufficient conclusions of law. See, e.g.. Arrovo, 796 P.2d
at 687; Marshall. 791 P.2d at 889-90; Sierra. 754 P.2d at 981.
Thus, the lack of any conclusions of law whatsoever on the
voluntariness of Lisa Genovesi's consent also requires remand.
In State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993), the Utah
Supreme Court announced that the trial court's ultimate
determination whether consent was voluntary or involuntary is a
conclusion of law to be reviewed for correctness. Jg. at 1271.
In determining whether the requisite voluntariness exists, the
trial court must examine •• *the totality of all the surrounding
circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and the
details o f police conduct." Arrovo. 796 P.2d at 689 (quoting
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S. Ct. 2041,
2047 (1973)); accord Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1262-63. Moreover,
"[t]he prosecution bears the burden of proving that the
defendant's consent was voluntary.11 Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1263.
Furthermore, the supreme court has enumerated certain
factors to be considered in evaluating the totality of the
circumstances surrounding consent, which include: (1) the
absence of a claim of authority to search by the officers;
(2) the absence of an exhibition of force by the officers; (3) a
mere request to search; (4) cooperation by the owner of the
5. Jason Genovesi asserts on appeal that the trial court's third
finding is unsupported by the evidence, insofar as Deputy Patrick
asked for permission to take measurements and search for
evidence, not to remove any evidence. However, since the scope
of one's consent under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution is determined by what a reasonable person would
understand the exchange between the officer and the one from whom
consent is sought to mean, State v. Castner. 825 P.2d 699, 705
(Utah App. 1992), it would be absurd to hold that an officer who
finds evidence as the result of an otherwise constitutional
search cannot remove that evidence merely because he asked to
£Sia££ll for it, not to take it*

920803-CA
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[residence]; and (5) the absence of deception or trick on the
part of the officer." State v. Whittenback. 621 P.2d 103, 106
(Utah 1980).
Additionally, this court has recently stated:
In order for consent to be voluntary,
(1) there must be clear and positive
testimony that the consent was unequivocal,
specific, and freely and intelligently given;
(2) the government must prove consent was
given without duress or coercion, express or
implied; and (3) the courts must indulge
every reasonable presumption against the
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights
and there must be convincing evidence that
such rights were waived.
State v, Harmon. 854 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah App. 1993).
Accordingly, on remand, the court should consider the above
factors and make proper findings of fact and conclusions of law
as to the voluntariness of Lisa Genovesi's consent.
As a final matter, we address Jason Genovesi's argument that
the trial court failed to address his independent state
constitutional analysis, which was properly raised and argued
before that court, or to explain why it did not address that
argument. At the hearing on his motion to suppress, Genovesi
argued that not only was Lisa Genovesi's consent involuntary
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, but
it was also invalid under article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution. However, the trial court made no mention of this
independent state constitutional analysis in its ruling on
Genovesi's motion to suppress. Accordingly, since this matter
must be remanded due to the insufficient findings of fact and
conclusions of law underlying the trial court's order denying
Genovesi's motion to suppress, the trial court is further
instructed to address this matter on remand.6
Because we conclude that the trial court's order denying
Genovesi's motion to suppress was insufficient, we do not reach
the other issues raised by the parties.

6. The matter of the photographs also merits
deal of confusion has arisen concerning which
taken during which search. The parties would
resolve this difficulty on remand in order to
for the trial court.
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comment. A good
photographs were
be well advised to
clarify this matter

CONCLUSION
The trial court's findings of fact and order denying Jason
Genovesi's motion to suppress are insufficient to allow adequate
appellate review. Accordingly, we vacate that ruling and remand
this matter to the trial court to: (1) make findings of fact and
conclusions of law regarding the March 20 search; (2) make
additional findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the
March 21 search; and (3) address Genovesi's independent state
constitutional analysis, or give its reasons for not addressing
the same.

Leonard H. Russon,
Associate Presiding Judge

I CONCUR:

JTi- Slt/Lm&L
Judith M. Billings, Judge

BENCH, Judge (dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. This case should not be remanded
for findings and conclusions (as to the validity of the search of
the home) unless we can definitively hold that the evidence
obtained therefrom was prejudicial to the defendant.
The State urges us to assume, for the sake of argument,
"that both searches of Genovesi's home were improper, and that
all evidence obtained during those searches should have been
suppressed." The State contends that any error in denying the
motion to suppress was harmless because other independent
evidence overwhelmingly established defendant's guilt. Based on
this argument, it would not matter what the trial court may find
or conclude about the search of the home. see, e.g.. state v.
Scandrett. 24 Utah 2d 202, 468 P.2d 639 (1970) (affirming
conviction for second-degree murder where guilt was shown by
untainted evidence so overwhelming that there was no likelihood
of different result).
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I dissent because the main opinion fails to address a
potentially dispositive issue.

Russell W. Bench, Judge
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